2024 网鼎杯 半决赛 安全运营挑战赛 威胁分析
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2024 网鼎杯 半决赛 安全运营挑战赛 威胁分析
官方 writeup 未公布，无标准答案
按照题目描述进行检材分析
First of all - 在此之前
对题目提供的附件进行分析，题目提供了以下附件
- dump.mem
- disk.ad1
- disk.ad1.txt
其中，文件 disk.ad1.txt 的内容为
Created By AccessData® FTK® Imager 4.7.1.2
Case Information:
Acquired using: ADI4.7.1.2
Case Number:
Evidence Number:
Unique Description:
Examiner:
Notes:
--------------------------------------------------------------
Information for C:\Users\skills\Desktop\disk.ad1:
[Custom Content Sources]
F:\:NONAME [NTFS]|[root]|Windows|*(Wildcard,Consider Case,Include Subdirectories)
F:\:NONAME [NTFS]|[root]|ProgramData|*(Wildcard,Consider Case,Include Subdirectories)
F:\:NONAME [NTFS]|[root]|Program Files (x86)|*(Wildcard,Consider Case,Include Subdirectories)
F:\:NONAME [NTFS]|[root]|Program Files|*(Wildcard,Consider Case,Include Subdirectories)
F:\:NONAME [NTFS]|[root]|Documents and Settings|*(Wildcard,Consider Case,Include Subdirectories)
F:\:NONAME [NTFS]|[root]|PerfLogs|*(Wildcard,Consider Case,Include Subdirectories)
F:\:NONAME [NTFS]|[root]|System Volume Information|*(Wildcard,Consider Case,Include Subdirectories)
[Computed Hashes]
MD5 checksum: a576646c40769abb7dd36904417b6a4f
SHA1 checksum: 9cee1fe36957674626661e1197b19b5f0b047026
Image information:
Acquisition started: Tue Nov 5 11:04:42 2024
Acquisition finished: Tue Nov 5 11:49:00 2024
Segment list:
C:\Users\skills\Desktop\disk.ad1
Image Verification Results:
Verification started: Tue Nov 5 11:52:50 2024
Verification finished: Tue Nov 5 12:07:07 2024
MD5 checksum: a576646c40769abb7dd36904417b6a4f : verified
SHA1 checksum: 9cee1fe36957674626661e1197b19b5f0b047026 : verified
由此可以得知，文件 disk.ad1 是由 FTK Imager 所制作的磁盘镜像，文件 dump.mem 是目标计算机上捕获的内存镜像
对于 disk.ad1 文件，可以使用 FTK Imager 进行加载并挂载到虚拟盘符；而对于 dump.mem 文件，可以使用 Volatility 进行取证分析（需要内存 镜像中系统版本对应的符号表）或者使用 R-Studio 对内存中的 NTFS 结构表进行读取分析，或者直接使用 Strings 进行暴力检索分析
威胁分析 - 01
在调查网络性能或安全问题时，了解特定应用程序在一段时间内的数据传输情况对于检测异常流量和潜在威胁至关重要。通过分析网络活动日志，我们可以确定是否存在数据泄露或异常通信。
请问，firefox 进程自有记录以来一共发送了多少字节的数据？（请将答案编辑并存入
/opt/wxfx/answer/1.txt文件中，参考/opt/wxfx/example目录）
基于题目描述，可以定位到 Windows 的服务报告使用数据库文件 SRUDB.dat
参考资料 See all Windows 11 network data usage – addshore
在 FTK Imager 定位到 SRUDB.dat 文件的路径 F:\Windows\System32\sru\SRUDB.dat
使用 NetworkUsageView - NirSoft 进行查看
定位到 firefox.exe 进程的记录
3981907 + 384784 = 4366691
即可确定答案
4366691
威胁分析 - 02
识别安全防护软件的查杀记录，对于评估系统受感染的程度和了解攻击者所使用的工具至关重要。通过检查安全日志，可以获取被检测到的威胁信息。
请问，Windows Defender 检测到的第一个恶意软件的威胁 ID 是什么？（请将答案编辑并存入
/opt/wxfx/answer/2.txt文件中，参考/opt/wxfx/example目录）
在 disk.ad1 文件的磁盘数据中，定位到 F:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\ 文件夹
将整个文件夹进行提取
根据 Windows Defender 的日志 ID 表 Microsoft Defender Antivirus event IDs and error codes - Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Microsoft Learn 可以知道，当 Windows Defender 检测到威胁时所记录的日志，其日志 ID 为 1116
使用 FullEventLogView - NirSoft 进行分析
或者直接定位到 Windows Defender 的操作日志文件 Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender%4Operational.evtx
Windows Defender 已从隔离区删除一个项目。
有关详细信息，请参阅以下内容:
https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=37020&name=Trojan:Win32/Meterpreter.O&threatid=2147729928&enterprise=0
名称: Trojan:Win32/Meterpreter.O
ID: 2147729928
严重性: Severe
类别: Trojan
用户: DESKTOP-M3JIVN3\skills
安全智能版本: AV: 1.421.82.0, AS: 1.421.82.0
引擎版本: 1.1.24090.11
即可确定答案
2147729928
威胁分析 - 03
了解恶意软件的内部名称（如开发者给它的命名）有助于识别其家族、版本和特定功能，进而制定有效的防御策略。
请问，系统中正在运行的恶意软件的内部名称是什么？（请将答案编辑并存入
/opt/wxfx/answer/3.txt文件中，参考/opt/wxfx/example目录）
思路一 基于常见关键词进行定位
对内存镜像的 Strings 进行分析，经过常见恶意程序的关键词匹配，可以定位到内存中的以下部分
<------------- [ Welcome to DarkSide] ------------->
What happend?
----------------------------------------------
Your computers and servers are encrypted, backups are deleted. We use strong encryption algorithms, so you cannot decrypt your data.
But you can restore everything by purchasing a special program from us - universal decryptor. This program will restore all your network.
Follow our instructions below and you will recover all your data.
What guarantees?
----------------------------------------------
We value our reputation. If we do not do our work and liabilities, nobody will pay us. This is not in our interests.
All our decryption software is perfectly tested and will decrypt your data. We will also provide support in case of problems.
We guarantee to decrypt one file for free. Go to the site and contact us.
How to get access on website?
----------------------------------------------
Using a TOR browser:
1) Download and install TOR browser from this site: https://torproject.org/
2) Open our website: http://darksidfqzcuhtk2.onion/GM0CG8TNZ83ZPUD15TL76BLDCG0ST24TR6NXG1J2AVXSKF8KS4KFIIN2ON5GRWD4
When you open our website, put the following data in the input form:
Key:
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
!!! DANGER !!!
DO NOT MODIFY or try to RECOVER any files yourself. We WILL NOT be able to RESTORE them.
!!! DANGER !!!
基于已知明文，可以定位到相关进程
PS D:\Downloads\attachment\attachment> .\volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f .\dump.mem --profile=Win10x64_14393 yarascan -Y "Your computers and servers are encrypted"
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Rule: r1
Owner: Process SearchProtocol Pid 4036
0x2079976dcc5 59 6f 75 72 20 63 6f 6d 70 75 74 65 72 73 20 61 Your.computers.a
0x2079976dcd5 6e 64 20 73 65 72 76 65 72 73 20 61 72 65 20 65 nd.servers.are.e
0x2079976dce5 6e 63 72 79 70 74 65 64 2c 20 62 61 63 6b 75 70 ncrypted,.backup
0x2079976dcf5 73 20 61 72 65 20 64 65 6c 65 74 65 64 2e 20 57 s.are.deleted..W
0x2079976dd05 65 20 75 73 65 20 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 20 65 6e 63 e.use.strong.enc
0x2079976dd15 72 79 70 74 69 6f 6e 20 61 6c 67 6f 72 69 74 68 ryption.algorith
0x2079976dd25 6d 73 2c 20 73 6f 20 79 6f 75 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f ms,.so.you.canno
0x2079976dd35 74 20 64 65 63 72 79 70 74 20 79 6f 75 72 20 64 t.decrypt.your.d
0x2079976dd45 61 74 61 2e 20 0d 0a 20 42 75 74 20 79 6f 75 20 ata.....But.you.
0x2079976dd55 63 61 6e 20 72 65 73 74 6f 72 65 20 65 76 65 72 can.restore.ever
0x2079976dd65 79 74 68 69 6e 67 20 62 79 20 70 75 72 63 68 61 ything.by.purcha
0x2079976dd75 73 69 6e 67 20 61 20 73 70 65 63 69 61 6c 20 70 sing.a.special.p
0x2079976dd85 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 66 72 6f 6d 20 75 73 20 2d rogram.from.us.-
0x2079976dd95 20 75 6e 69 76 65 72 73 61 6c 20 64 65 63 72 79 .universal.decry
0x2079976dda5 70 74 6f 72 2e 20 54 68 69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 ptor..This.progr
0x2079976ddb5 61 6d 20 77 69 6c 6c 20 72 65 73 74 6f 72 65 20 am.will.restore.
Rule: r1
Owner: Process SearchProtocol Pid 4036
0x2079977314d 59 6f 75 72 20 63 6f 6d 70 75 74 65 72 73 20 61 Your.computers.a
0x2079977315d 6e 64 20 73 65 72 76 65 72 73 20 61 72 65 20 65 nd.servers.are.e
0x2079977316d 6e 63 72 79 70 74 65 64 2c 20 62 61 63 6b 75 70 ncrypted,.backup
0x2079977317d 73 20 61 72 65 20 64 65 6c 65 74 65 64 2e 20 57 s.are.deleted..W
0x2079977318d 65 20 75 73 65 20 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 20 65 6e 63 e.use.strong.enc
0x2079977319d 72 79 70 74 69 6f 6e 20 61 6c 67 6f 72 69 74 68 ryption.algorith
0x207997731ad 6d 73 2c 20 73 6f 20 79 6f 75 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f ms,.so.you.canno
0x207997731bd 74 20 64 65 63 72 79 70 74 20 79 6f 75 72 20 64 t.decrypt.your.d
0x207997731cd 61 74 61 2e 20 0d 0a 20 42 75 74 20 79 6f 75 20 ata.....But.you.
0x207997731dd 63 61 6e 20 72 65 73 74 6f 72 65 20 65 76 65 72 can.restore.ever
0x207997731ed 79 74 68 69 6e 67 20 62 79 20 70 75 72 63 68 61 ything.by.purcha
0x207997731fd 73 69 6e 67 20 61 20 73 70 65 63 69 61 6c 20 70 sing.a.special.p
0x2079977320d 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 66 72 6f 6d 20 75 73 20 2d rogram.from.us.-
0x2079977321d 20 75 6e 69 76 65 72 73 61 6c 20 64 65 63 72 79 .universal.decry
0x2079977322d 70 74 6f 72 2e 20 54 68 69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 ptor..This.progr
0x2079977323d 61 6d 20 77 69 6c 6c 20 72 65 73 74 6f 72 65 20 am.will.restore.
Rule: r1
Owner: Process svchost.exe Pid 5784
0x00d1a10d 59 6f 75 72 20 63 6f 6d 70 75 74 65 72 73 20 61 Your.computers.a
0x00d1a11d 6e 64 20 73 65 72 76 65 72 73 20 61 72 65 20 65 nd.servers.are.e
0x00d1a12d 6e 63 72 79 70 74 65 64 2c 20 62 61 63 6b 75 70 ncrypted,.backup
0x00d1a13d 73 20 61 72 65 20 64 65 6c 65 74 65 64 2e 20 57 s.are.deleted..W
0x00d1a14d 65 20 75 73 65 20 73 74 72 6f 6e 67 20 65 6e 63 e.use.strong.enc
0x00d1a15d 72 79 70 74 69 6f 6e 20 61 6c 67 6f 72 69 74 68 ryption.algorith
0x00d1a16d 6d 73 2c 20 73 6f 20 79 6f 75 20 63 61 6e 6e 6f ms,.so.you.canno
0x00d1a17d 74 20 64 65 63 72 79 70 74 20 79 6f 75 72 20 64 t.decrypt.your.d
0x00d1a18d 61 74 61 2e 20 0d 0a 20 42 75 74 20 79 6f 75 20 ata.....But.you.
0x00d1a19d 63 61 6e 20 72 65 73 74 6f 72 65 20 65 76 65 72 can.restore.ever
0x00d1a1ad 79 74 68 69 6e 67 20 62 79 20 70 75 72 63 68 61 ything.by.purcha
0x00d1a1bd 73 69 6e 67 20 61 20 73 70 65 63 69 61 6c 20 70 sing.a.special.p
0x00d1a1cd 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 66 72 6f 6d 20 75 73 20 2d rogram.from.us.-
0x00d1a1dd 20 75 6e 69 76 65 72 73 61 6c 20 64 65 63 72 79 .universal.decry
0x00d1a1ed 70 74 6f 72 2e 20 54 68 69 73 20 70 72 6f 67 72 ptor..This.progr
0x00d1a1fd 61 6d 20 77 69 6c 6c 20 72 65 73 74 6f 72 65 20 am.will.restore.
排除掉正常系统服务，即可确定到 Process svchost.exe Pid 5784 为恶意进程
思路二 对磁盘非常规文件进行排查
使用 R-Studio 对内存中的 NTFS 结构数据库进行分析，找到 F:\Users\skills\svchost.exe
常规情况下，文件 svchost.exe 不会存在于用户目录中，可以确定为可疑文件
思路三 使用 Yara 进行匹配分析
MemProcFS 自带了一份 Malware Yara 匹配规则表，可以直接使用
Volatility 的话，可以使用 Simple python script for merging malware yara rules from https://github.com/Yara-Rules/rules 将 Yara 官方规则库，以及一些增强型 Yara 规则库，进行合并之后进行加载，也可以定位到恶意进程
综上，都可以定位到恶意软件的信息，其文件路径为 F:\Users\skills\svchost.exe 进程信息为 Process svchost.exe Pid 5784
将可执行文件进行提取
PS D:\Downloads\attachment\attachment> .\volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f .\dump.mem --profile=Win10x64_14393 dumpfiles --regex "skills\\svchost\.exe" -D .
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
ImageSectionObject 0xffff9a88056a9ef0 5784 \Device\HarddiskVolume3\Users\skills\svchost.exe
DataSectionObject 0xffff9a88056a9ef0 5784 \Device\HarddiskVolume3\Users\skills\svchost.exe
可以得到文件 file.5784.0xffff9a8805ed2010.dat
对 file.5784.0xffff9a8805ed2010.dat 查看其 PE 文件信息
即可确定答案
calimalimodumator.exe
威胁分析 - 04
逆向分析恶意软件时，确定其在进程内存中存储关键数据的位置，对于理解其工作机制和防范进一步的攻击非常重要。
请问，恶意软件在进程内存中存储密钥的内存地址是什么？（请将答案编辑并存入
/opt/wxfx/answer/4.txt文件中，参考/opt/wxfx/example目录）
在上文中，已经在内存中找到了恶意软件的勒索信息
When you open our website, put the following data in the input form:
Key:
lsJTyyTnzJlGQ1I6sfwV6oVcXaRynwN6mWphA7BKXEDIHJcDlhNNHsrxlkpggRChK2nQ7wP0sknJvl37lbqElTopkUywK3QnfJFmqDBSCmFISeWSudjgwxB4kKSp7h4VySHeu4LmDiZXTAh1dbZHWxTtZ0bA6PhCoDrbGkctY4rucITW4IdYUZJC8d2B7SFnr5EA7EoRkajrZW54brM5Kgwqsz67qzH6Hk0Vr3EDcnGzNjGQBapJczIWkgPtMCJdTkeemQ34XH7wawXu3eOGV3uJlBZNoSuaxtDHMGApS8EWsUXhafMW8WxFLAPLCo6pdm7MLcLsVDp9iBXU1sLv2KkGyUJbO0KOmom9f1JREuidviHRfsndEgMFBAjyq5v4VEIraiioAbtWM7eecYaXPVt3rolsBi8mtjxLOpFj73NPPitoIDxBNfHGzXxvRTXi06Pjx9pRnAtjIqoq5wovnHa8uBel8nq8yDJTk7NWdGdsv3yVwV2TmBin7OvFqHN9lweFNJyuziKCVGEtSaglUNudMmpFnNObGlhfh58jQsrQiQZ2d3AOFsi
使用 yarascan 进行检索
PS D:\Downloads\attachment\attachment> .\volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f .\dump.mem --profile=Win10x64_14393 yarascan -Y "lsJTyyTnzJlGQ"
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
......
Rule: r1
Owner: Process svchost.exe Pid 5784
0x00d1a585 6c 73 4a 54 79 79 54 6e 7a 4a 6c 47 51 31 49 36 lsJTyyTnzJlGQ1I6
0x00d1a595 73 66 77 56 36 6f 56 63 58 61 52 79 6e 77 4e 36 sfwV6oVcXaRynwN6
0x00d1a5a5 6d 57 70 68 41 37 42 4b 58 45 44 49 48 4a 63 44 mWphA7BKXEDIHJcD
0x00d1a5b5 6c 68 4e 4e 48 73 72 78 6c 6b 70 67 67 52 43 68 lhNNHsrxlkpggRCh
0x00d1a5c5 4b 32 6e 51 37 77 50 30 73 6b 6e 4a 76 6c 33 37 K2nQ7wP0sknJvl37
0x00d1a5d5 6c 62 71 45 6c 54 6f 70 6b 55 79 77 4b 33 51 6e lbqElTopkUywK3Qn
0x00d1a5e5 66 4a 46 6d 71 44 42 53 43 6d 46 49 53 65 57 53 fJFmqDBSCmFISeWS
0x00d1a5f5 75 64 6a 67 77 78 42 34 6b 4b 53 70 37 68 34 56 udjgwxB4kKSp7h4V
0x00d1a605 79 53 48 65 75 34 4c 6d 44 69 5a 58 54 41 68 31 ySHeu4LmDiZXTAh1
0x00d1a615 64 62 5a 48 57 78 54 74 5a 30 62 41 36 50 68 43 dbZHWxTtZ0bA6PhC
0x00d1a625 6f 44 72 62 47 6b 63 74 59 34 72 75 63 49 54 57 oDrbGkctY4rucITW
0x00d1a635 34 49 64 59 55 5a 4a 43 38 64 32 42 37 53 46 6e 4IdYUZJC8d2B7SFn
0x00d1a645 72 35 45 41 37 45 6f 52 6b 61 6a 72 5a 57 35 34 r5EA7EoRkajrZW54
0x00d1a655 62 72 4d 35 4b 67 77 71 73 7a 36 37 71 7a 48 36 brM5Kgwqsz67qzH6
0x00d1a665 48 6b 30 56 72 33 45 44 63 6e 47 7a 4e 6a 47 51 Hk0Vr3EDcnGzNjGQ
0x00d1a675 42 61 70 4a 63 7a 49 57 6b 67 50 74 4d 43 4a 64 BapJczIWkgPtMCJd
即可确定答案
0x00d1a585
威胁分析 - 05
分析恶意软件的行为包括了解其在系统中启用了哪些权限，这有助于评估其潜在的危害和攻击范围。通过检查进程的权限列表，可以发现其可能执行的敏感操作。
请问，恶意软件在其进程中启用了多少个权限？（请将答案编辑并存入
/opt/wxfx/answer/5.txt文件中，参考/opt/wxfx/example目录）
已知恶意程序的进程信息为 Process svchost.exe Pid 5784 的情况下，查看进程权限信息
PS D:\Downloads\attachment\attachment> .\volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f .\dump.mem --profile=Win10x64_14393 privs -p 5784
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Pid Process Value Privilege Attributes Description
-------- ---------------- ------ ------------------------------------ ------------------------ -----------
5784 svchost.exe 2 SeCreateTokenPrivilege Create a token object
5784 svchost.exe 3 SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege Replace a process-level token
5784 svchost.exe 4 SeLockMemoryPrivilege Lock pages in memory
5784 svchost.exe 5 SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege Present,Enabled Increase quotas
5784 svchost.exe 6 SeMachineAccountPrivilege Add workstations to the domain
5784 svchost.exe 7 SeTcbPrivilege Act as part of the operating system
5784 svchost.exe 8 SeSecurityPrivilege Present,Enabled Manage auditing and security log
5784 svchost.exe 9 SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege Present,Enabled Take ownership of files/objects
5784 svchost.exe 10 SeLoadDriverPrivilege Present,Enabled Load and unload device drivers
5784 svchost.exe 11 SeSystemProfilePrivilege Present,Enabled Profile system performance
5784 svchost.exe 12 SeSystemtimePrivilege Present,Enabled Change the system time
5784 svchost.exe 13 SeProfileSingleProcessPrivilege Present,Enabled Profile a single process
5784 svchost.exe 14 SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege Present,Enabled Increase scheduling priority
5784 svchost.exe 15 SeCreatePagefilePrivilege Present,Enabled Create a pagefile
5784 svchost.exe 16 SeCreatePermanentPrivilege Create permanent shared objects
5784 svchost.exe 17 SeBackupPrivilege Present,Enabled Backup files and directories
5784 svchost.exe 18 SeRestorePrivilege Present,Enabled Restore files and directories
5784 svchost.exe 19 SeShutdownPrivilege Present,Enabled Shut down the system
5784 svchost.exe 20 SeDebugPrivilege Present,Enabled Debug programs
5784 svchost.exe 21 SeAuditPrivilege Generate security audits
5784 svchost.exe 22 SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege Present,Enabled Edit firmware environment values
5784 svchost.exe 23 SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Present,Enabled,Default Receive notifications of changes to files or directories
5784 svchost.exe 24 SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege Present,Enabled Force shutdown from a remote system
5784 svchost.exe 25 SeUndockPrivilege Present,Enabled Remove computer from docking station
5784 svchost.exe 26 SeSyncAgentPrivilege Synch directory service data
5784 svchost.exe 27 SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Enable user accounts to be trusted for delegation
5784 svchost.exe 28 SeManageVolumePrivilege Present,Enabled Manage the files on a volume
5784 svchost.exe 29 SeImpersonatePrivilege Present,Enabled,Default Impersonate a client after authentication
5784 svchost.exe 30 SeCreateGlobalPrivilege Present,Enabled,Default Create global objects
5784 svchost.exe 31 SeTrustedCredManAccessPrivilege Access Credential Manager as a trusted caller
5784 svchost.exe 32 SeRelabelPrivilege Modify the mandatory integrity level of an object
5784 svchost.exe 33 SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Present,Enabled Allocate more memory for user applications
5784 svchost.exe 34 SeTimeZonePrivilege Present,Enabled Adjust the time zone of the computer's internal clock
5784 svchost.exe 35 SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege Present,Enabled Required to create a symbolic link
对 Attributes 为 Enabled 的权限进行筛选统计，即可确定答案
23
威胁分析 - 06
在分析勒索软件的行为时，确定其在内存中加载的位置对于深入理解其运行机制和发现潜在的漏洞非常重要。通过内存取证，可以找到打开勒索软件文件的设备的虚拟地址。
请问，打开勒索软件文件的设备的虚拟地址是什么（16 进制）？（请将答案编辑并存入
/opt/wxfx/answer/6.txt文件中，参考/opt/wxfx/example目录）
在上文中，已经确认了恶意程序的可执行文件在内存中的偏移地址 0xffff9a88056a9ef0
PS D:\Downloads\attachment\attachment> .\volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f .\dump.mem --profile=Win10x64_14393 dumpfiles --regex "skills\\svchost\.exe" -D .
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
ImageSectionObject 0xffff9a88056a9ef0 5784 \Device\HarddiskVolume3\Users\skills\svchost.exe
DataSectionObject 0xffff9a88056a9ef0 5784 \Device\HarddiskVolume3\Users\skills\svchost.exe
进入 volshell 进行分析
PS D:\Downloads\attachment\attachment> .\volatility_2.6_win64_standalone.exe -f .\dump.mem --profile=Win10x64_14393 volshell -p 5784
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Current context: svchost.exe @ 0xffff9a8805cfb4c0, pid=5784, ppid=7136 DTB=0x30400000
Welcome to volshell! Current memory image is:
file:///D:/Downloads/attachment/attachment/dump.mem
To get help, type 'hh()'
>>> dt('_FILE_OBJECT',0xffff9a88056a9ef0)
[_FILE_OBJECT _FILE_OBJECT] @ 0xFFFF9A88056A9EF0
0x0 : Type 5
0x2 : Size 216
0x8 : DeviceObject 18446632507711949952
0x10 : Vpb 18446632507711953536
0x18 : FsContext 18446651757703889232
0x20 : FsContext2 18446651757801468480
0x28 : SectionObjectPointer 18446632507741760728
0x30 : PrivateCacheMap 0
0x38 : FinalStatus 0
0x40 : RelatedFileObject 0
0x48 : LockOperation 0
0x49 : DeletePending 0
0x4a : ReadAccess 1
0x4b : WriteAccess 0
0x4c : DeleteAccess 0
0x4d : SharedRead 1
0x4e : SharedWrite 0
0x4f : SharedDelete 1
0x50 : Flags 278594
0x58 : FileName \Users\skills\svchost.exe
0x68 : CurrentByteOffset 18446632507729944408
0x70 : Waiters 0
0x74 : Busy 0
0x78 : LastLock 0
0x80 : Lock 18446632507729944432
0x98 : Event 18446632507729944456
0xb0 : CompletionContext 0
0xb8 : IrpListLock 0
0xc0 : IrpList 18446632507729944496
0xd0 : FileObjectExtension 0
>>> hex(18446632507711949952)
'0xffff9a8804580c80L'
即可确定答案
0xffff9a8804580c80