Hyperfiletable
Sherlock Scenario
There has been a new joiner in Forela, they have downloaded their onboarding documentation, however someone has managed to phish the user with a malicious attachment. We have only managed to pull the MFT record for the new user, are you able to triage this information?
在 Forela 中有一名新成员加入，他们已经下载了他们的入职文件，但是有人成功通过恶意附件钓鱼攻击了该用户。我们只能获取到该新用户的 MFT 记录，您能处理这些信息吗？
题目数据
Task 1
MFT 的 MD5 哈希值是多少？
File path and name: D:\Downloads\hyperfiletable\mft.raw\mft.raw
Name: mft.raw
Type: .raw
Size: 115.5 MB
Bytes: 121110528
Modified: 2023-06-02 22:38:10
Attributes: A
Copies: 1
CRC32: 29C15241
CRC64: 4EE3D6ED243B4347
MD5: 3730C2FEDCDC3ECD9B83CBEA08373226
Answer
3730C2FEDCDC3ECD9B83CBEA08373226
Task 2
信息
这里使用到 MFTECmd 这款工具
系统中唯一用户的名称是什么？
使用 MFTECmd 这款工具解析 mft 文件
PS D:\_Tool\_ForensicAnalyzer\MFTECmd> .\MFTECmd.exe -f D:\Downloads\hyperfiletable\mft.raw\mft.raw --csv "D:\Downloads\hyperfiletable\mft.raw"
MFTECmd version 1.2.2.1
Author: Eric Zimmerman (saericzimmerman@gmail.com)
https://github.com/EricZimmerman/MFTECmd
Command line: -f D:\Downloads\hyperfiletable\mft.raw\mft.raw --csv D:\Downloads\hyperfiletable\mft.raw
Warning: Administrator privileges not found!
File type: Mft
Processed D:\Downloads\hyperfiletable\mft.raw\mft.raw in 1.5877 seconds
D:\Downloads\hyperfiletable\mft.raw\mft.raw: FILE records found: 110,818 (Free records: 7,240) File size: 115.5MB
CSV output will be saved to D:\Downloads\hyperfiletable\mft.raw\20240102085049_MFTECmd_$MFT_Output.csv
分析输出的结果文件，在其 中搜索关键词 \user，即可得到用户个人文件夹的路径
Answer
Randy Savage
Task 3
被该用户下载的恶意 HTA 的名称是什么？
使用用户的默认下载目录作为关键词进行搜索 .\Users\Randy Savage\Downloads
由于数据量较大，完整数据未在此体现
| EntryNumber | SequenceNumber | InUse | ParentEntryNumber | ParentSequenceNumber | ParentPath | FileName | Extension | FileSize | ReferenceCount | ReparseTarget | IsDirectory | HasAds | IsAds | SI<FN | uSecZeros | Copied | SiFlags | NameType | Created0x10 | Created0x30 | LastModified0x10 | LastModified0x30 | LastRecordChange0x10 | LastRecordChange0x30 | LastAccess0x10 | LastAccess0x30 | UpdateSequenceNumber | LogfileSequenceNumber | SecurityId |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 103820 | 7 | TRUE | 105011 | 2 | .\Users\Randy Savage\Downloads | Onboarding.hta | .hta | 1144 | 1 | FALSE | TRUE | FALSE | FALSE | FALSE | FALSE | Archive | Windows | 21:40.1 | 21:45.6 | 21:40.1 | 21:45.6 | 21:40.2 | 22:01.0 | 21:40.1 | 27166224 | 375731114 | 1793 | ||
| 103820 | 7 | TRUE | 105011 | 2 | .\Users\Randy Savage\Downloads | Onboarding.hta:Zone.Identifier | .Identifier | 389 | 1 | FALSE | FALSE | TRUE | FALSE | FALSE | FALSE | Archive | Windows | 21:40.1 | 21:45.6 | 21:40.1 | 21:45.6 | 21:40.2 | 22:01.0 | 21:40.1 | 27166224 | 375731114 | 1793 |
即可找到答案
Answer
Onboarding.hta
Task 4
恶意 HTA 文件的 ZoneId 是多少？
上文记录的末尾就有
[ZoneTransfer]
ZoneId=3
HostUrl=https://doc-10-8k-docs.googleusercontent.com/docs/securesc/9p3kedtu9rd1pnhecjfevm1clqmh1kc1/9mob6oj9jdbq89eegoedo0c9f3fpmrnj/1680708975000/04991425918988780232/11676194732725945250Z/1hsQhtmZJW9xZGgniME93H3mXZIV4OKgX?e=download&uuid=56e1ab75-ea1e-41b7-bf92-9432cfa8b645&nonce=u98832u1r35me&user=11676194732725945250Z&hash=j5meb42cqr57pa0ef411ja1k70jkgphq
Answer
3
Task 5
恶意 HTA 的下载 URL 是什么？
Answer
https://doc-10-8k-docs.googleusercontent.com/docs/securesc/9p3kedtu9rd1pnhecjfevm1clqmh1kc1/9mob6oj9jdbq89eegoedo0c9f3fpmrnj/1680708975000/04991425918988780232/11676194732725945250Z/1hsQhtmZJW9xZGgniME93H3mXZIV4OKgX?e=download&uuid=56e1ab75-ea1e-41b7-bf92-9432cfa8b645&nonce=u98832u1r35me&user=11676194732725945250Z&hash=j5meb42cqr57pa0ef411ja1k70jkgphq
Task 6
信息
接下来使用 MFTExplorer 这个工具
HTA 文件的分配大小是多少？（字节）
在 MFTExplorer 的输出结果中，可以得到以下信息
**** FILE NAME ****
Type: FileName, Attribute #: 0x8, Size: 0x78, Content size: 0x5A, Name size: 0x0, Content offset: 0x18, Resident: True
File name: ONBOAR~1.HTA (Length: 0xC)
Flags: Archive, Name Type: Dos, Reparse Value: 0x0, Physical Size: 0x1000, Logical Size: 0x478
Parent Mft Record: Entry/seq: 0x19A33-0x2
Created On: 2023-04-05 13:21:40.0706726
Content Modified On: 2023-04-05 13:21:40.0732403
Record Modified On: 2023-04-05 13:21:40.2279587
Last Accessed On: 2023-04-05 13:21:40.0732403
Answer
4096
Task 7
HTA 文件的实际大小是多少？（字节）
Answer
1144
Task 8
用户何时下载了 PowerPoint 演示文稿？
| EntryNumber | SequenceNumber | InUse | ParentEntryNumber | ParentSequenceNumber | ParentPath | FileName | Extension | FileSize | ReferenceCount | ReparseTarget | IsDirectory | HasAds | IsAds | SI<FN | uSecZeros | Copied | SiFlags | NameType | Created0x10 | Created0x30 | LastModified0x10 | LastModified0x30 | LastRecordChange0x10 | LastRecordChange0x30 | LastAccess0x10 | LastAccess0x30 | UpdateSequenceNumber | LogfileSequenceNumber | SecurityId |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 105622 | 4 | FALSE | 107430 | 3 | .\Users\Randy Savage\Documents\Work | Proposal.pptx | .pptx | 16552989 | 1 | FALSE | TRUE | FALSE | FALSE | FALSE | FALSE | Archive | Windows | 11:49.7 | 11:54.0 | 12:14.6 | 11:54.0 | 11:54.0 | 26143496 | 375276644 | 1793 |
**** STANDARD INFO ****
Type: StandardInformation, Attribute #: 0x0, Size: 0x60, Content size: 0x48, Name size: 0x0, Content offset: 0x18, Resident: True
Flags: Archive, Max Version: 0x0, Flags 2: None, Class Id: 0x0, Owner Id: 0x0, Security Id: 0x701, Quota Charged: 0x0
Update Sequence #: 0x18EEB08
Created On: 2023-04-05 13:11:49.7425214
Content Modified On: 2023-04-05 13:11:53.9605745
Record Modified On: 2023-04-05 13:12:14.5858420
Last Accessed On: 2023-04-05 13:11:53.9605745
Answer
05/04/2023 13:11:49
Task 9
用户记录了他们的工作凭据，请问他们的密码是什么？
在 .\Users\Randy Savage\Documents\Work\notes.txt 的 MFT 数据中，得到以下明文信息
New onboarding process:
Download onboarding tool from Google Drive
Username: RSavage
Password: ReallyC00lDucks2023!
Answer
ReallyC00lDucks2023!
Task 10
在
C:\Users\目录下还剩下多少个文件？（递归计算）
这题可以直接借助 Excel 的强大的统计能力
首先，使用筛选功能，对 ParentPath 列的数据进行筛选，使用菜单中的文本筛选功能
然后将结果复制黏贴为新的工作表，将 IsDirectory 筛选为 FALSE 模式，继续筛选
题目答案存在争议
我自己使用 MFTECmd 导出的 csv 报告进行筛选分析，但是出来的结果和标准答案不符合，不确定是哪里出现问题
Answer
3471